






By REX B. LITTLE, CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY
A TERM PAPER FOR
THE NAVY COMPTROLLERSHIP COURSE




In a study of management and, perforce, human relations, I have been
atruck with the multitude of identical convictions held by industrial executives,
writers, and naval officers, concerning the subject. This paper results from
qy desire to increase my own knowledge and awareness of, and facility in, a skill
that is too often neglected. Perhaps the reading of it may sharpen your re-
actions, your recollections of similar experiences in your own past, and help you
to solve a problem or examine your own conduct and state of mind in the future.
The content is not revolutionary or earth shaking. Men have been dealing
with other men, subordinate and superior, for quite awhile. The business world
las posed the example for many ways of doing something administratively better
in the military service, and in turn has benefitted from experiences proven on
the large scale in the services.
The field of this study is limited to administration, since the parallel
with industry is being drawn. This does not rule out the existance of differences
in the organizations, and of motivating forces therein; the Navy (with which I
deal as being representative and most familiar to me, certainly) still must have
exacting discipline and immediate obedience to orders. Yet it is through the
years of administration of training and discipline, the thousands of repetitions
of drills and required responses in "peace time", that we obtain the reactions
and attitudes necessary in battle.
The subject is intangible. The "how" cannot be set dosm in a pat set
of rules which any individual can follow and become a successful administrator






"People are funny" are trite words born in antiquity and having various
shades of meaning according to their usage and purpose. To quote the more spe-
cifically meaningful and pertinent words of one of our current mentors and educa-
tors, "people are human beings." A study of human relations In any field or or-
ganization involves an appreciation of the fact that individuals will persist in
being, not cogs in a machine, but human beings, logical and illogical, intelligent
and unintelligent, responsive or in need of motivation, abnormal in our concep-
tion and perfectly normal in their own thoughts, rationalizing their own faults
and detecting ours, each with self-interest as a driving influence, in whatever
position they happen to be, and whether in industry or the Navy.
\
Naone questions or denies the fact that a need exists in the operation of
any organization for an understanding of the human and social elements at work.
Herbert Blumer classified that need as a problem of industrial enterprises. If
it is a problem in industry, how much more so in the Navy as an organization five
times the size of the General Motors Corporation and far more complex.
In "Education for Executives" Chester I. Barnard stresses three needs
t
(l) the need of inculcating an appreciation of the importance and of the in-
evitability of non-logical behavior on the part of human beings; (2) instruc-
tion as to the nature of general social systems; and (3) instruction about
formal organizations as organic and evolving systems. 2
These needs will be referred to and amplified later.
Examples of the similarities between the Navy and an industrial corpora-
tion are multitudinous. On a large scale, their organizations are similar in
the categories of (a) administration, wherein the Navy Department in Washington,
'Robert Dubin, Human Relations in Administration, (New York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1951) » introduction by Herbert Blumer, p v.
2Chester I. Barnard, Education for Executives , quoted ibid . , pp 7-8.
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D.C.and the far-flung district and fleet commands compare "with the home office
and outlying district, area, or foreign offices of business; (b) operation,
wherein activities in "the field" and afloat carry out the policies and directives
of the Navy Department similar to the activities of the production and sales de-
partments of an industry. Their management is more particularly analogous; £he
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Board of Directors) preside over the overall objectives
and missions, which are put in the form of directives by the Secretary of the
Navy (President); the Chief of Naval Operations (General Manager or Executive
Vice President) is in a top-management policy and particularly decision-making
position, assisted by his Deputies (Vice Presidents) and Chiefs of Technical
Bureaus (Department Managers); Commanders and Commanding Officers (Area, District,
and Branch Managers) direct the operations of their particular decentralized ac-
tivities, guided by directives from top management and technical (functional) re-
quirements of the technical bureaus (departments), aided at all echelons by line
and staff officers (junior executives) and non-commissioned officers (foremen
and supervisors). In fact, industry adopted the terms "line" and "staff" directly
from the military, with the exact delineations of meaning and functions. As
particular instances of similarity, both industry and the Navy are adopting and
expanding the concept and function of the comptroller (controller), and industry
is following the Navy into the field of an Office of Coordination of Systems.
The Navy, in fact, operates many industrial plants and activities (Naval Research
Laboratory, Naval Gun Factory, naval shipyards) comparable in size, in number
and type of civilian personnel, and in almost all operations, to large industrial
corporations.
In no field do the Navy and industry reach such common ground in their
needs and problems as in administration and management. Effective administration
involves the direction of the coordinated and cooperative efforts of persons in
attaining a common ibjective. This requires competent executives, with par-
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tieular ability in dealing with human beings. And; human beings are the members
of any organization, be it industrial, political, religious, social, or military.
Newman analyzes administration in terras of what an administrator does, i.e.,
planning, organizing, assembling resources, directing, and controlling. He goes
on to say:
Plans are made to guide human activity, and they should be formulc?ted in
light of their effects on many people. Organization deals with jobs for
people and the established relationships between these jobs. Assembling
executive personnel is 100 percent human relations. Direction is concerned
with the way one person gives instructions to others. Control is effective
only if human behavior conforms to plans. In other words, human relations
is not a separate issue, but an ever-present one."1
He does not imply that human relationship is the only factor to be considered, or
even the most important always; he includes human relations "as an integral part
of each administrative process.' 1 No more do 1 say that human relations always is
the sole or most important consideration of a military executive; I will deal
later with exceptions peculiar to the military organization.
Not too long ago "labor" was the exploited underdog that "dapital" used
as it wished to build the empires of the nineteenth century—and later. The
common laborer was uneducated, underprivileged, and rarely expected more as his
lot. The office worker enjoyed only a slightly more livable plane; and both
were hired and fired at will as "business" wrung from them the last degree of
time and energy. Labor was not specialized or highly trained because industry
did not require it, except in the few particular crafts. Workers were easily
replaced, and "human relations" was a term in the theorists text books. Of
course some workers took definite pride in their "trade", particularly when
associated with the large, powerful concerns; and presidents of industry rose
from the laboring ranks.
During the same period the Navy was still in the era of "wooden ships
•Hv'.
.
H. .Cewman, Administrative Action
,
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1951), pp 4 and 7.

-5-
\d iron men" — the men were of iron physically, but the enlisted ranks vere in
_nuch the same status as industrial workers, poorly paid, uneducated as a whole.
Their work did not require highly technical training, they Hollowed an almost
unvariable routine under direct orders, and they neither knew of nor cared about
the missions and objectives of their commanders and forces. Again, "human re-
lations" was a term unheard of and leadership was exercised by strong example,
rigid discipline, and a hard hand. However, as a whole they lived by tradition
and an intense loyalty to their ships and shipmates, taking greater pride in
their ability as rugged seamen and in the professional ability of their officers
than the industrial employee did in any similar manner. And this was true even
of the many who joined the Navy from the ranks of the unemployed, and the
probationers from courts of law.
The employer-employee status in industry has undergone a revolution — a
revolution that had its birth in eventual recognition of freedom of the individual.
The worker's complete dependence on his employer, and the latter' s decisions in
business, has been greatly nullified by unionization, labor laws, nobility of
living, and social security, even to the extent that the employer's decisions in
business without the voice of the employee are questioned in many instances. The
pendulum has swung past center, in fact, and the restrictions on management and
"capital" have destroyed a large measure of business incentive and progress. As
stated by Heron:
Among the broad gains or positive achievements, we find these: (l)The mass
market of prosperous workers has become universally recognized as essential
to the success of all business; this mass purchasing power has been multi-
plied over any previous standard. (2) The organized workers have gained
great strength, largely with the help of artificial government protection
amounting to hothouse care; they are now throwing off even that paternalistic
sponsorship. (3) Organized workers have obtained, by demand, negotiation,
government grant, and sometimes by violence, the right to participate in a
wide variety of management decisions."-1- We all hope most fervently that the
1Alexander H. Heron, Why Men 7;ork , (Stanford, Balifornia: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1948), PP 167-169.
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pessiraistic outcomes he envisions as possible — industrial anarchy, dictator-
ship, lower standard of living, and a declining national strength — do not
come about, but that management will lead a new industrial order in which all
interested parties will share the power and the thinking in an orderly fashion,
as he assumes. That will involve, indeed, the highest order of human relations!
A parallel revolution has come about in the status of enlisted men in
the Navy, albeit in a more controlled manner due to the continuing power and
necessity of discipline in a military organization. The same forces have been
at work on the same kind of human beings who stemmed from the same environments
as the industrial employee, but who elected to join, or were pushed or pulled
into, the service. The level of education has risen steadily, fostered by a
necessity for higher intelligence levels to operate the ships and equipment that
have evolved from the technild&gigal age; and intensive, specialized training
within the service has also resulted, which requires in turn a higher and higher
level of basic education and capacity in the individual — a cycle is in process.
The Navy has expanded in step with the times and industry, management and command
have become more and more complex and decentralized, and more foremen and super-
visors (non-commissioned officers) are necessary. The enlisted man today is a
thinking, reasoning, ambitious, young man, no longer a mere hand and body on the
end of a line or swab.
Thus we see the Navy, as well as industry, as an evolving, not a static,
organization, made up of people and growing, not just a vast machine composed of
electronic and mechanical devices. We see the "needs' 1 as mentioned before — the
need for well educated, highly technical executives who can appreciate the im-
portance of non-logical behavior on the part of human beings ; the need for under-
standing on the part of executives of the nature and workings of general social,
systems and of organic and evolving organizations; all in the field of human
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relations. In fulfilling a part of these needs, the Navy has benefitted from the
experiences and studies of industry, and more particularly from the impact of
close war relations with men who entered the service directly from active industry
and business — experiences and examples both good and bad,
A further need is expressed by Dubin in his writing on human relations;
... we need more substantive knowledge about military organizations.
"Ihether we like it or not, vie have come to an age where of all the traditional
types of organizations, collectively, we probably know least about the mili-
tary. ?/e know something about political, religious, business, fraternal,
educational, and recreational organizations. . . . But up to ,Jorld Bar II,
military organizations were largely unknown and uninteresting to the vast
majority of us. The probability is that the future will require us to im-
prove our knowledge about military organizations and increase our interest
in them. ... In short, these studies of the Navy serve to give us a sub-
stantive knowledge of the armed forces as a type of organized human activity.*
The impartiality, completeness, and bias of his studies are open to question, but






So what to do about the needs? I will not presume to outline a course
of education that would put forth finished human relations experts and executives
in either industry or the Navy, ue can, however, look at a few facts and prac-
tices, well known to most of us who have worked with personnel, which will bear
more thought.
Preliminary to di§cu§§ing pfesen|-day employer-emol oyee relations in
industry and analogous relations within the ?,Iavy, I wish to make it clear now
that I am not going to draw a strict oarallel in the Hairy by referring only to
officer-enlisted men relations. The analogy does apply as between the two
commonly-thought-of large groupings of personnel making up any armed service; but
it also goes farther than that. It applies between non-commissioned officers,
particularly between the Chief Petty Officers, and the enlisted men under their
supervision; it applies between relatively senior and junior officers. There is
also a difference in motivation and organization status between the employees
in industry and trie enlisted men in the Navy; the latter are bound more closely
in normally voluntary obligated "service" to the country and the public, and the
majority feel that and take pride in it, snide and c-reless remarks of cynics
and scoffers to the contrary. The Navy can be classified more as a "profession"
than as a "business", and all levels of individuals engaged in that profession
are motivated and guided, in greater or less degree, by the code of that pro-
fession, written, unwritten, moral, or imposed. In any case, the enlisted man
is more closely associated with the aims and purpose of his organization, in
common with his superiors, than is the paid employee of a business organization.
A few businesses, such as "cCormick & Company, have more closely approached that
relationship through employee participation in management. To better illustrate,





The commonest formula in terms of which the difference between business and
the profession, is popularly expressed as the distinction between "profess-
ionalism" and "commercialism." Now in the immediate sense the essence of pro-
fessionalism consists in a series of limitations on the aggressive pursuit
of self-interest. Thus, medical men are forbidden in the code of medical
ethics, to advertise their services. ... it does not follow that, in adher-
ing to the code as well as they do, medical men are actually acting contrary
to their self-interest in a sense in which business men do not. ... In both
cases the self-interest of the typical individual is on the whole harnessed
to keeping the institutional code which is dominant in his own occupational
sphere.
Dn his first "hitch" in the service, the status of the enlisted man is most
closely related to that of the normal industrial worker; as both officer and en-
listed man continue in service and accept it as a chosen profession, they attain
a common bond in the codes, the traditions, the discipline ->f their "occupational
sphere." i'his study will treat with both phases.
In the field of employer-employee relations, Ralph E* Lee of the General
Uotors Corporation wrote a booklet which outlines a series of meetings for fore-
men and executives of General iiotorsj in those meetings were discussed the re-
lationships that existed, and that should exist, between executives and foremen
as a group and the employees who worked under them. I will quote rather freely
from that booklet in succeeding paragraphs, for he states concisely what so many
others have said in so many different ways.
In opening the meetings, he made the point that:
. * . the widely differing needs of this complicated "chop suey" of humanity
,'the individuals who make up the employees groupl cannot be satisfied with
any general set of rules or any general understanding or contract, no matter
how apparently fair or representative these may be. Industrial employee can-
not for long be led or driven aa a herd of cattle, for his is contrary to
human nature. Human beings are fundamentally and incurably individualists
at heart.
^
Do we find anything contrary to that belief in the Navy today'.- Gantt also nen-
tioned in one of his works that "the age of driving men to work is past,", and
•^-Talcott Parsons, "The kotiviation of Economic Activities" Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science , :iay, 1940, quoted in Dubin, op. cit «>
p. 36.




stated that we must find a motivating force,
Lee next advocates separating the conditions which affect oar work into
two groups—one made up of conditions we can't do much about and the other made
up of conditions we can do something about. The first includes government, law,
unions, social changes, military strategy, post war, politics, international re-
lations, class distinction; the Navy could include periodic change of station,
regulations, separations, fanily haedshiDS. The second grouping consists of per-
sonality, knowledge of your job, attitude, leadership, fairness, human under-
standing, self control, and salesmanship. ..e will examine these latter virtues,
and lack of them, as we go along
—
yes, even salesmanship applies in the Navy, for
every individual has occasion to sell himself, consciously or not. Also, the
N^vy can always stand good representation, as a whole—and we are not getting it,
generally, from the ex-service men, in their informal conversations and writings.
Lee is quoted farther along in his initial meeting:
To my way of thinking, there are no tricks to getting along with people . . .
I still believe Emerson was right when he said, "What you are speaks so
loudly I canH hear what you say." Since what we are and what we think are
inseparable, tnen our attitude toward our employees as a group is far more
important in getting along with them than all the people-persuading tricks
we can learn in a lifetime.*
I would substitute ''working with them" for ''getting along with them," He con-
tinues :
I wouldn't be surprised if we discovered that most of our problems with
employes today have come about as a result of employes thinking of their sup-
ervisors and management in terms of THZY, and of supervisors and management
thinking of employes in terms of THEY.
How many times have read or been told th.st a division officer should know the
name, family status, hobbies, and personal characteristics of every man in his
division, and address him by name? All of us have seen, or experienced, examples





every man in his ship (excluding such craft as carriers and battleships!); and
we know the results accruing. That practice does not extend to familiar use of
nicknames, embarrassing kidding, or back slacoing, which the good enlisted aan
does not expect, like, or appreciate. It means knowing our men as individuals,
which they do appreciate and which gives them a sense of belonging, of recognition
—and a knowledge that poor work will be recognized as well as good. Bat learning;
names does not suffice. Ha must maintain contact, for evory individual is sub-
ject to change, incident to the state of his mind, his family relations, his
physical health, his financial status.
Texts and studies and scriptures on Leadership in the military services
are legion. I could set down ray own principles gained from experience (or by
copying those writings^ but I choose to quote Mr. Lee again, not only because he
covers the field in such an expressive manner but because it is refreshing, and
pertinent to this study, to view the almost complete agreement between industry
and the service as to what constitutes a leader.
V/hat a follower seeks in a leader, what an enlisted man looks for in his
superior officer in most cases (commissioned or not):
1. He wants a leader who believes his work is important, and all those ivho
are in it with him.
2. He wants to follow a leader who is not afraid . . . not afraid of his
position, not afraid of his own boss, not afraid of a tough job, not afraid
of the people who ?vork for him, not afraid of honest mistakes—either theirs
or his.
3. He wants a leader who gets a kick out of his work and helps his followers
to get a kick out of theirs.
4. He wants a leader who gets a kick out of seeing a man do what that man
thought he would never be able to do.
5. He wants a leader who will fight for him until hell freezes over, if the
leader believes him bo be in the right.
6. He wants a leader who will tell him what's ^Arhat hen he knows darn well
it's coming to him, and a leader who will do it without losing his temper.
7. He wants a leader who recognizes him as a person, regardless of his ex-
perience, school or training, and regardless of his religion, race, station
in life, or the lodge or union he belongs to.
8. He wants a leader who knows most of the answers but who will admit it if
he doesn't know, and go get the answer.
9. He v;ants a leader Mho is predictable—that is, one he can depend upon to
be the same all the time.
10. He wants a leader he can't put anything over on but who is human enough
to look the other way when he occasionally makes an ass of himself.
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11. He wants a leader who he knows understands him, to whom he is not afraid
to go when he has been a fool, when he's ashamed, when he's about washed up,
or when he's proud and happy.
12. He wants a leader who's as square as a die, who can't be bribed by anyone,
and, being square himself, can see through crookedness in any form, regard-
less of how much or how little crookedness there is.
13. He wants a leader he can get to when he really needs him and can get away
from when he's through with him.
14. He wants a leader who can shim him how to do a job without showing off or
showing him up.
15. He wants a leader who will give him a chance to try something hard he has
never done.
16. He wants a leader who will list n to him when he has something to say but
remembers an appointment when he drivels.
17. He wants a leader who he believes sincerely wants him to succeed and who
will be proud of him when he does.
18. He wants a leader who seems to be trying to work himself out of his own
job and his boys into it.
19. He wants a leader who respects his pride and never corrects him in the
presence of others or gossips about him.
20. He wants a leader who knows all that's going on first-hand and turns a
deaf ear to gossip.
21. He wants a leader who, if he can't be loyal to his company or supervisory
quits rather than work for them and talk about them at the same time.
22. He wants a leader with the authority to promote, demote or let him go, as
he knows he deserves.
Thewe are traits in common to outstanding leaders I have personally
known:
1. Leaders seem to be so completely wrapped up in their jobs that they can't
spare the time to worry about the jobs they might get or about other people
who seem to be getting ahead faster than they.
2. Leaders find in their work not only a means of earning but also a reason
for livigg.
3. Most leaders have hides as thick as a rhinoceros' as far as their own
personal pride is conderned, but they are extremely sensitive to the pride of
others—and always on guard against hurting others needlessly.
4. Most leaders instinctively listen more than they talk, and talk only when
they have something worthwhile and appropriate to say. When they listen
they automatically sift out of the words they hear, the nubbin of what the
other fellow h.-s on his mind. When they talk they use words the other fellow
can understand—and no more words than necessary.
5. Having faith in the ability of their work to speak for itself, they are
not afraid of their jobs or of anyone who threatens their jobs. Thus, they
are always free from self-consciousness and are always themselves, trtiether
with top executives or the men on the job.
6. Most leaders are not naturally inclined to invent, or become authors, or
create new systems, or demonstrate their own personal talents or accomplish-
ments publicly, Neither do they spend much time selling themselves.
7. They have confidence that their work will speak for itself. Without
arrogance, ajfid free from fear or awe of other pepple, they are in an unbiased
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position to recognize and evaluate the ability of others, to encourage its
development and to employ it to the best possible advantage of all concerned.
8. Free from fear for self, non-competitive toward others, and fair in their
appraisal of others, leaders win the confidence and respect of those who
willingly accept them as referees, judges and counselors.
9. All leaders control their temper to a marked degree—do not give way to
uncontrolled enthusiasm or despair—but move from day to day, from week to
week, on an even keel.
10. Leaders do not permit themselves to be bogged down with unimportant de-
tails. They are naturally inclined to brush aside detail, with an eye for
the key-log in a jam. While they are patient with those who cannot see be-
yond detail, they will not permit these people to interfere with the removal
of the key-log.
11. Leaders have a highly developed sense of feeling the lay of the land be-
fore they have facts to prove it. While respectful of facts and logic, they
are able to read between the lines and anticipate the answer to a problem
before it is available. They are logical, but they check their own logic
—
and that of others—with their hunch or feeling toward the matter. (Intuition
is sometimes called horse sense—that quality which, if possessed by one of
two people equally informed, makes the one a successful leader and the other
questionable.)
12. Most leaders have the faculty of gaining confidence without becoming in-
timate with individuals. This avoids personal entanglements and the obliga-
tions they impose. liost leaders are, therefore, in a position to deal fairly t
squarely and impartially with their men on the sole basis of their individual
merits
.
13. Most leaders are incapable of intense hatred, grudges or bitter quarrels,
and are not conscious of enemies.
1,. All leaders suggest rather than order. [Obvious limitations app^y, both
in industry and the military^]
Signs of Leadership
\
1. Alow voice and, frequently, slow
and thoughtful speech.
2. A neat appearance in moderate style.
3« Rarely in a hurry.
4. Easy gait and moderate pace.
5. Does not show all he feels and thinks.






11. Laughs only when he means it, and
then under control.
12. Rarely interrupts.
13. Rarely says "I."




15. Rarely tells everything he knows.
16. Makes sure you know the difference between his opinions and his facts.
17. Easy to meet and easy to leave.
18. Enjoys a constest of wits and a game of chance.
19. A good loser.
20. Bored with too much logic.
21 Is not usually a heavy reader.
22. Hard to sweep off his feet.
23. Quickly gets to the point.
24. Never takes himself too seriously,
25. Does not like to do things himself; likes to do what he does through
others.
26. likes people.
27. Likes to lead.
28. Has assurance.
29. Not inclined to sit still for long.
30. Good memory.
The leadership of most of us must be somewhere between the high and low limits
of our specifications or we wouldn't be supervisors at all . The ability
to take constructive criticism should be added to our already long list of
specifications for leadership. If we can't take it, the chances are we will
never be able to hand it out to others with any hope of making it stick. *
The man would be truly great who could live up to all the "specifications." To
date he had not been born! The Navy has one further axiom to add: "You can't
give orders until you have learned to take them." That learning is a major pur-
pose of the U.i Naval Academy, the Naval Reserve Officer Training Courses, and
and officer indoctrination course; the non-commissioned officers (petty offiders)
learn it in the hard school of experience by starting at the bottom.
At no point in the line of employer-employee relations is a single group
of individuals placed in more direct contact with the employee, while still having
responsibility to management, than the foremen. This position is most closely
related to the Chief Petty Officer in the Navy. He must look both ways at once
in his responsibilities—upward to his boas, and downward to his subordinates
and the workers. In both industry and the Navy he is still an employee, or en-
listed man, but in training for advancement to executive, or commissioned officer,
status. He is blessed with the task of carrying out at the work level the rules,
policies, and standards originated by his superiors, and to obtain enthusiastic




Jnfortunately, human nature being what it is, the system and, too often, the
arbitrary issuance of orders or new methods of management without thought to the
ways and practicability of accomplishment, tends to constrain the foreman to
concentrating more of his attention and effort upward to please fche immediate
superior, thus securing his own position, than downward toward the feelings and
capacities of his subordinates. Thus originates the axiom "loyalty down as well
as up," Certainly a Chief Petty Officer, and foreman, has need of all the attri-
butes of a leader; but it is vital that all executives, when executing their
superiors' orders or policies, think of the effects on their subordinates, the
"how" and the practicability of carrying out the directive in the way they have
expressed it; time or circumstances may not permit pondering in the Navy, and
in such cases training, indoctrination, and discipline should prove their worth,
both in giving and in the execution, with initiative, of orders. Following the
same axiom, a superior must not hesitate to take responsibility for errors or
inefficiency in a task for which he is responsible, no matter how many worthy
subordinates he 'told" to carry it out. The willingness to battle for a worthy
cause in behalf of your men despite the displeasure or initial lack of enthusi-
asm of a superior), the fortitude to stand back of a coinmitment thoughtfully
made to your subordinates, or explain why it is impossible to carry it out and
why you were wrong in making it; all contribute to loyalty down.
Other factors that cannot be overlooked in our dealing with subordinates
include their self respect, in their work and in their acceptance by others with
whom they associate. Closely allied is "recognition," which, justifiably given,
can be more of an influence to boost the morale and personal ego of an individual
than any comforts or services or rewards; withheld, it can just as readily de-
flate and demoralize, destroying stature in the eyes of others.

III. JU^IOR-SENUR RELATIONS
Let us deal now with the relations of a junior with his superior . e
touched briefly on the manner in which a Chief Petty Officer or foreman could
have his attention focused on the reactions of his superiors, to the detriment
of his responsibility to the feelings and efforts of his workers. The junior
officer or junior executive can as easily be overpowered and influenced by his
superior's rank and use of authority to the point where he accepts every sug-
gested idea of the senior,, finally stops voicing or even having an independent
thought, and rides along on the wishes and orders of that superior, developing
into a perfect "yes" man. This may be flattering to some executives but is re-
pugnant or downright maddening to most, who want to receive constructive criti-
cism, refreshing and impersonal opposition, or honest opinions.
The solution, for the junior lies in knowledge of his job, confidence in
his own ability and opinions, ability to listen, and confidence in the ability
of his superior and his exercise of authority.
It might be well at this point to look at what is meant by "authority"
and what is involved in its use. Herbert A. Simon defines authority "as the
power to make decisions which guide the actions of another.
"
x His application
refers to industry but it would appear to fit the military interpretation as \
well. He stresses the point that the subordinate role "establishes an area of
acceptance in behavior within which the subordinate is willing to accept the
decisions made for him by his superior." That acceptance, for the authority to |
be effective, must be based on confidence in the purpose and confidence that
the command will be effective in achieving that purpose; it may be based on
. . . his faith in the ability of those who issue the command, his recog-
nition that they have information he does not have, and his realization
that his efforts and those of his fellow workers will be ineffective in
reachingthe desired objective without some coordination from above. ,'ith-





in limits, he will even accept commands he knows to be incorrect because he
does not wish to challenge or unsettle a system of authority that he believes
to be beneficial to his aims in the long run.
Again, remember we are dealing primarily with administration. Simon continues:
A voluntary organization with poorly defined objectives has perhaps the
narrowest range of acceptance. An army, where the sanctions as well as the
customs are of extreme severity, has the broadest area of acceptance.
He makes the point that military literature recognizes the importance of this
"area of acceptance" as a fundamental element in tactics and refers to Colonel
J.F.C. Fuller's description of the psychology of battle in his book The Poun-
dations of the Jcience of ,ar.
The use of authority in direct personal relations can certainly be
abused, either in or out of the service. Authority in business must be based
primarily on competence; in the service it is inherently based on rank, which in
turn is generated from ccnnpetence and experience, without which the unquestioning
obediance to commands , in administration or in battle, would be lacking. In
industry or the Navy, authority by virtue of rank may be abused by using it to
2hide ones own mistakes or uncertainties.
1Ibidt, pp. 193-194.
o
See also Edmund P. Learned, David N. Ulrich, Donald R. Booz, Executive
Action
,
(Andover, Mass.j Andover Press) copyrighted by the President and Fe lows
arvard College, 1951, p. 60.

IV. ASSOCIATION OF EQUALS
In a consideration of personal relationships we should deal briefly with
a phase not often considered, that of association with equals or senior assis-
tants.
Self confidence and self respect go hand in hand in determining the atti-
tude of one executive toward his team mate, whether it be another vice president
:>r another captain on a staff—or another junior officer in the wardroom, for
that matter. And those attributes can be built only upon ability and honesty of
Durpose. The executive, whether he be a foreman, a Chief Petty Officer, or a
department head, cannot secure the confidence and cooperation of those with
whom he works on a horizontal plane of effort unless he contributes a full measure
of energy, attention to duty, responsibility, and loyalty.
Again, ability to acknowledge one's own errors and correct them is a
prime virtue, rather than the facility in finding a scapegoat.
Courtesy, tact, firmness in our own considered convictions, control of
temper, are all familiar, but too frequently neglected, practices.
Perhaps the most difficult fact to realize—or admit—is that the majority
of our contemporaries are just as smart as we arei They are thinking individuals
who can bring to bear experience equal to or greater than ours and who are
equally desirous of and as capable of arriving at a problem solution that may be
different from ours but is fully as logical and acceptable. The ability to
propose, propound, debate, discuss, compromise, and finally agree confirms the
superiority of two heads.
If the superior can exercise the above qualities in working with a senior
assistant or deputy, and use his "authority" only at the final stage of considered
decision, he has really taken full advantage of assistance, a fuller confidence





There are a multitude of fields in which human relations is a factor.
The Inst to be treated here is that of "communications,"
A directive can be written painstakingly and routed efficiently and
logically, but is the writer's real intent and meaning expressed? If so, does
the reader really understand what the writer had in mind, what the situation is,
what is desired in the way of implementation, cooperation, coordination? And if
most of those considerations do get across, how well is it understood on down
the line, as expressed by the receiver to his subordinates? I am not speaking
here of the explicit order, or the command, not requiring inte pretation. Herein
the Navy has an advantage in its own cryfctic "language" or use of standard terms
known to all, to a greater extent than the usual business organization; often
referred to disparagingly, the usage has a proven merit and necessity, again in
the continuous training for that ultimate battle when speed, accuracy, and
brevity of direct, physical communications are the essence.
Barnard calls communication the foundation of cooperative group activity.
Roethlisberger writes "that a good portion of the executive's environment is
verbal seems hardly open to question." In instructing, persuading, explaining*
directing, delegating, the executive is constantly putting his ideas and thoughts
into words that someone else, of the same or differing status and capacity, must
"get." Roethlisberger goes on to say that the executive must
... be able to interpret skillfully what people say, for in so far as his
work involves the interactions of human beings his data comes from what he
hears as well as from what he sees and does. T/hether he likes it or not,
he has to practice this difficult artj yet he has no explicit tools for doing
it. He either picks up the skill intuitively or tries to organize his work
so that the need for exercising it is at a minimum. This latter method is
likely to be unsuccessful because it leads him to busy himself more and more
with logical, statistical, and oversimplified abstractions or lofty principles
about human motivations and conduct. In doing so he loses ^ouch with the
concrete situation before him.-'-
-^Fritz J. Roethlisberger, "The Executive's Environment is Verbal",




Have you known any naval officers who fit that description?
Another writer has some concrete suggestions for a program of improving
verbal communications. First, establish a "climate of Communications," accomp-
lished by group meetins where "top management n talks to all levels of employees,
and by regular conferences held at all levels with people who are directly super-
vised. Second, set up a training program in three principle areas: (l) the
ability to speak clearly and distinctly to one or more people, or in a group;
(2) the ability to plan and lead a meeting or conference; (3) the combination
of things required to talk informally to another person in an interview or con-
versation in the day-to-day contacts.
The booklet "Conference Sense, 11 published in the Navy, has a lot to
offer.
Communications "up" is probably as important as communication "down."
If the executive is isolated in his ivory tower (or cabin), inaccessable and
unapproachable except "through channels," he will lose the touch and the feeling
of his organization and how it is functioning. As expressed by one writer
Only by taking time from immediate concerns can the executive develop an
understanding of the basic human forces at work in his organization. And
ills greatest gains may come from the example he sets for his own subordi-
nates to follow in their relationships with others in the company.
He makes the point that face-to-face contacts require a. definite skill, and that
therein the executive needs full recognition of the importance which subordinates
attach to his prestige, after which he can overcome his disadvantage by exercise
of patience and discretion.
The principle- bar to effective co ; imunication "up" is the executive's
official position. As the above author points out, in the same book:
If a top executive has not made it a practice to walk through his plant,
Harold P. Zelko, "Taking the Mystery Out of Communications", The aournal
of Industrial Training , July-August, 1951, reprinted in The Management Review s
October, 1951, pp. 617-418.
^Learned, Ulrich, & Rooz, op. cit. , p. 114.
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his occasional trips are likely to convince him that he is right in not often
leaving his own world. .lis mere presence may be so upsetting that work
suffers. "There must be something wrong, or the boss wouldn't come here. 1 '
This has an application In the Kawy to informal, unannounced "trips through the
plants not the periodic, scheduled, formal inspections.
n
»n executive should maintain contact with ranks and levels several rungs
down the ladder, but not use information gained to embarrass an iinmediate
subordinate. He should be a good listener to juniors, but not commit himself to
action when listening to a gripe session or a salesmanship demonstration; con-
sider it and then "go through channels." He shoull be available and yet be able
to conclude a conversation easily without pain; a subordinate feels that he and
his job are recognized, that he is more than a cog, and is encouraged by example
to broaden his relationships with his own subordinates, i£ he can have occasional
"communication" with a bos3 not his own immediate superior.

VI. CONCLUSION
If we could all live up to even an approximation of the naval officer
that John Paul Jones described we would have little difficulty with our human
relations problems. Robert A. Milliken said: "The filling station men have
improved the mariners and courtesy of the American public more than all the
colleges in the country." And in an article titled "The Mainspring of Human
Relations," the author wrote:
His ja person's'] courtesy makes things pleasanter and easier for everybody,
for there is no" double standard to his thoughtfulness. With the late George
Bernard Shaw, he believes that the great secret is not to have bad manners
or good manners, but having the iaa*i manners for all human sould. The sin-
cerity of his manners keeps them refreshingly free from apish bowing and
scraping, and also free from any patronizing air of condescension.
The Navy has been termed "one of the the largest corporations in the
world." Despite the inherent differences between the organizations of industries
and the Mavy, and their methods of doing business, the people involved remain
human beings essentially, in or out of uniform. All -:,re primarily motivated by
a self-interest best expressed as an ultimate goal, that of "success."
Author unknown, "The Mainspring of Good Human Relations," The Manage-
ment Review , "ept, 1951, p. 523.

